This is true, but let's be clear- it doesn't make PRS the fall guy for Gibson's problems-
What PRS was saying was, there was room in the market for high quality, innovative electrics in the upper mid and boutique end of the spectrum and he was correct. Look at Suhr and Andersen in the same period- they had a good understanding of customer needs, and even more important, optimizing the value point = Customer Requirements at a price that the target market can afford.
Gibson's problem is they thought that they could simply increase price without doing the analysis and they entirely leaned on brand power- as a result, their value points were way off base, and over time, practically every other manufacturer was able to undercut Gibson with better ability to meet user needs/quality and Gibson's brand has suffered.
And that's ultimately why Gibson has a short window to get optimized- competitors from IBI, YAGS and Fender on the low end, Reverend & Godin in the middle, and PRS at the high end have significantly impacted Gibson's walletshare (the amount an individual spends with a given company), they have significantly displaced Gibson's mindshare (how much people think about a brand) and they have a lot more guitars on the wall.
And that last one is incredible- It's amazing that Gibson didn't recognize that 'eating the seed corn' could not end well- when they priced dealers out, they left lots of wall space for everyone else and younger guitarists are far more likely to play Schetre, esp, IBI, Yags or Fender and people tend to buy the things they are familiar with (not to mention that have well optimized value points = great value for the cost).
Bottom line, yeah PRS had tremendous competitive impact, but that's what they are supposed to do- Gibson was totally asleep at the wheel chasing Firebird X and robo tuners.
The rest of the industry were happy to fill the gaps.